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Despite much recent interest in the clinical neuroscience of music processing, the cognitive organization of music as a domain of
non-verbal knowledge has been little studied. Here we addressed this issue systematically in two expert musicians with clinical
diagnoses of semantic dementia and Alzheimer’s disease, in comparison with a control group of healthy expert musicians. In a
series of neuropsychological experiments, we investigated associative knowledge of musical compositions (musical objects),
musical emotions, musical instruments (musical sources) and music notation (musical symbols). These aspects of music knowl-
edge were assessed in relation to musical perceptual abilities and extra-musical neuropsychological functions. The patient with
semantic dementia showed relatively preserved recognition of musical compositions and musical symbols despite severely
impaired recognition of musical emotions and musical instruments from sound. In contrast, the patient with Alzheimer’s disease
showed impaired recognition of compositions, with somewhat better recognition of composer and musical era, and impaired
comprehension of musical symbols, but normal recognition of musical emotions and musical instruments from sound. The
ﬁndings suggest that music knowledge is fractionated, and superordinate musical knowledge is relatively more robust than
knowledge of particular music. We propose that music constitutes a distinct domain of non-verbal knowledge but shares certain
cognitive organizational features with other brain knowledge systems. Within the domain of music knowledge, dissociable
cognitive mechanisms process knowledge derived from physical sources and the knowledge of abstract musical entities.
Keywords: music; semantic memory; dementia; semantic dementia; Alzheimer’s disease
Introduction
Understanding of the cognitive and neurological bases for music
processing has advanced greatly in recent decades (Peretz and
Coltheart, 2003; Peretz and Zatorre, 2005; Koelsch and Siebel,
2005; Stewart et al., 2006). However, while the perceptual and
affective dimensions of music have received much attention, the
cognitive organization of music knowledge has been less widely
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abstract objects (compositions, notes), emotions as represented
in music, physical sources (instruments), and symbols (musical
notation). Each of these dimensions of music could be considered
to convey ‘meaning’ beyond the purely perceptual features of the
sounds or notations that compose them. The nature of meaning in
music is a difﬁcult problem and the subject of much philosophical
and neuroscientiﬁc debate (Meyer, 1956; Huron, 2006; Patel,
2008). However, the terms ‘meaning’ and ‘knowledge’ are gen-
erally used by neuropsychologists to refer to learned facts and
concepts about the world at large. Here we use ‘music knowledge’
in this neuropsychological sense to refer to the association of
music with meaning based on learned attributes (such as recogniz-
ing a familiar tune or identifying the instrument on which it is
played); i.e. associative knowledge of music. Musical emotions
can also be considered in this framework, and warrant attention
as the aspect of music that is most immediately meaningful for
many listeners: while emotional responses themselves are not
learned, the attributes and conventions that convey emotions in
music are at least partly learned to the extent that they are prod-
ucts of a particular musical culture (Meyer, 1956).
The brain processes that mediate associative knowledge of
music have a wider extra-musical signiﬁcance. The organization
of brain knowledge systems is an important neurobiological and
clinical issue (Warrington, 1975; Wilson et al., 1995; Jefferies and
Lambon Ralph, 2006; Hodges and Patterson, 2007).
Neuropsychological accounts of brain knowledge systems have
been heavily inﬂuenced by the study of patients with verbal def-
icits. However, the extent to which verbally-derived models apply
to the processing of complex non-verbal objects and concepts
remains unresolved. Among the domains of non-verbal knowl-
edge, music is comparable to language in complexity, in its exten-
sive use of both sensory objects and abstract symbols, and in the
richness of its semantic associations (Peretz and Coltheart, 2003;
Peretz and Zatorre, 2005). While individual variation in musical
experience and expertise is wide, music (like language) is universal
in human societies. Despite the many formal similarities between
music and language, the cognitive status of such similarities, the
extent to which the cognitive processes that underpin them are
dissociable, and the brain mechanisms responsible all remain con-
troversial (Peretz and Zatorre, 2005; Fitch, 2006; Hebert and
Cuddy, 2006; Patel, 2008; Steinbeis and Koeslch, 2008a, b).
Within the domain of music, the cognitive framework is even
less clearly deﬁned: while it seems clear that music has a modular
cognitive organization (Peretz and Coltheart, 2003; Peretz and
Zatorre, 2005), the status of the putative modules and their neu-
ropsychological relations are debated. Music knowledge has
chieﬂy been studied in relation to other (e.g. perceptual) musical
modules. There is solid evidence for the independence of emotion
comprehension from other aspects of music (Peretz et al., 1998;
Grifﬁths et al., 2004; Gosselin et al., 2005, 2006, 2007; Khalfa
et al., 2005, 2008). However, components of music knowledge
have only infrequently been studied systematically in relation to
one another (e.g. Eustache et al., 1990; Ayotte et al., 2000;
Schuppert et al., 2000; Platel et al., 2003; Schulkind, 2004;
Koelsch, 2005; Hebert and Cuddy, 2006; Stewart et al., 2006;
Patel, 2008). The investigation of music knowledge provides an
opportunity to probe the detailed organization of a uniquely com-
plex, model non-verbal knowledge system and to elucidate brain
processes that mediate non-verbal knowledge.
The brain mechanisms that process meaning in music have been
addressed in functional imaging and electrophysiological studies of
healthy subjects (Halpern and Zatorre 1999; Platel et al., 2003;
Koelsch 2005; Satoh et al. 2006; Steinbeis and Koelsch 2008a, b)
and clinical studies of individuals with focal brain damage
(Eustache et al., 1990; Ayotte et al., 2000; Schuppert et al.,
2000; Mendez 2001; Stewart et al., 2006). However, there are
few systematic studies of music processing in neurodegenerative
disease (Crystal et al., 1989; Polk and Kertesz, 1993; Beversdorf
and Heilman, 1998; Cowles et al., 2003; Warren et al., 2003;
Fornazzari et al., 2006; Baird and Samson, 2009; Drapeau et al.,
2009; Hailstone et al., 2009). Although the study of cognitively
impaired patients is challenging, the study of music knowledge in
dementia offers valuable neurobiological and clinical perspectives.
Certain neuropsychological functions relevant to the processing of
music are characteristically affected in dementia: examples include
semantic memory in semantic dementia (Hodges and Patterson,
2007), and episodic memory and auditory pattern analysis in
Alzheimer’s disease (Taler et al., 2008). The nature of the neurop-
sychological deﬁcits in degenerative disorders offers a perspective
on the breakdown of brain knowledge stores that is complemen-
tary to the study of acute focal lesions: whereas lesions such as
stroke typically disrupt access to stored information, degenerative
disorders such as semantic dementia affect knowledge stores
proper (Jefferies and Lambon Ralph, 2006). Disorders in the fron-
totemporal degeneration spectrum (including semantic dementia)
have characteristic deﬁcits in the processing of emotion (Rosen
et al., 2002; Werner et al., 2007), which may be especially per-
tinent to music. Anatomically, the common dementia diseases
affect regions of the frontal, temporal and parietal lobes that are
likely to be critical for music processing (Platel et al., 2003; Satoh
et al., 2006; Stewart et al., 2006; Warren, 2008). Finally,
improved understanding of music processing, and more speciﬁcally
musical memory, would provide a rationale for music-based thera-
pies that have been used empirically in dementia populations
(Raglio et al., 2008). Consistent with evidence from cases of
focal brain damage (Wilson et al., 1995), selectively preserved
memory for music despite episodic memory impairment has
been described in patients with dementia, including Alzheimer’s
disease (Polk and Kertesz, 1993; Beatty et al., 1994; Cowles
et al., 2003). Relatively preserved knowledge of musical compo-
sitions, despite widespread impairment in other semantic domains,
has been described in semantic dementia (Hailstone et al., 2009).
However, musical deﬁcits have also been documented in dementia
(Bartlett et al., 1995; Baird and Samson, 2009).
Here we addressed the cognitive organization of music knowl-
edge systematically in two expert musicians with characteristic
dementia syndromes of semantic dementia and Alzheimer’s dis-
ease, in comparison with a control group of healthy expert musi-
cians. In a series of neuropsychological experiments, we
investigated associative knowledge of different aspects of music
in relation to musical perceptual abilities and extra-musical neu-
ropsychological functions. We hypothesized that semantic demen-
tia and Alzheimer’s disease would be associated with distinct
Music knowledge in dementia Brain 2010: 133; 1200–1213 | 1201patterns of music knowledge deﬁcits, in line with the characteristic
clinico-anatomical proﬁles of these diseases. Speciﬁcally, we
hypothesized that semantic dementia would produce deﬁcits of
musical instrument and emotion knowledge, reﬂecting a core def-
icit in extracting meaning from objects in the world at large asso-
ciated with anterior temporal lobe dysfunction; while Alzheimer’s
disease would produce deﬁcits of musical composition and nota-
tion knowledge, reﬂecting a core deﬁcit in the comprehension of
auditory and visual patterns associated with temporo-parietal
dysfunction.
Materials and methods
Subject details
Patient B.R. is a 56-year-old right-handed male professional trumpet
player and music teacher with 16 years music training and a career
performing in professional orchestras. He possessed absolute pitch. He
presented with a 2 year history of progressive word-ﬁnding and
naming difﬁculty, circumlocutory speech, and later, difﬁculty recogniz-
ing the faces and voices of friends. Three months prior to assessment
he had relinquished his professional musical commitments, but he con-
tinued to play the trumpet for several hours a day and to perform at
social events; he reportedly remained highly competent in both playing
and sight-reading. He continued to derive pleasure from music with no
change in musical preferences. On cognitive examination, Mini-Mental
State Examination score was 20/30, Frontal Assessment Battery score
was 13/18, and there was evidence of anomia and surface dyslexia.
The general neurological examination revealed a positive pout reﬂex
but was otherwise unremarkable. A clinical diagnosis of semantic
dementia was made. Brain MRI (Fig. 1) showed selective, predomi-
nantly left-sided anterior and inferior temporal lobe atrophy typical of
semantic dementia.
Patient W.W. is a 67-year-old right-handed retired music librarian
and curator with a PhD in musicology and over 50years experience
playing ﬁrst oboe with several orchestras; he was also a competent
amateur pianist. He presented with a 3 year history of progressive
forgetfulness, word and route ﬁnding difﬁculties. In the months lead-
ing up to the assessment, he had noted increasing difﬁculty reading
music and following the conductor, and he resigned from the last of
his three orchestral posts one month prior to testing; he also reported
errors playing the oboe and the piano. He continued to derive pleasure
from music with no change in musical preferences. On examination
Mini-Mental State Examination score was 24/30, and he exhibited
anomia, impaired recall and ideomotor apraxia. A clinical diagnosis
of Alzheimer’s disease was made. Brain MRI (Fig. 1) showed a typical
pattern of generalized cortical atrophy with disproportionate bilateral
hippocampal atrophy, and concurrent mild small-vessel ischaemic
changes. He was not taking an acetylcholinesterase inhibitor at the
time of the experimental assessment.
Control subjects
Six healthy professional musicians (age range 49–78years, four males)
with similar musical backgrounds to the patients participated as normal
control subjects for the assessment of music cognition. Controls had
between 11 and 22years formal musical training and all were currently
performing with professional orchestras as instrumentalists or conduc-
tors. Between two and six controls completed each of the tests in the
experimental battery.
Background assessment: general
neuropsychology, audiometry
and music perception
Music knowledge might potentially be inﬂuenced by cognitive skills
in non-musical domains, and by perceptual encoding of musical infor-
mation. Moreover, the relations between music knowledge and
other neuropsychological functions are of considerable interest in
their own right. Accordingly we assessed general neuropsychological
functions, peripheral hearing and music perceptual abilities in both
patients.
General neuropsychological assessment (Table 1) corroborated the
clinical diagnosis in each case. B.R. had profound impairment of
Figure 1 Representative T1-weighted coronal magnetic resonance sections showing proﬁles of brain atrophy in B.R. (above) and W.W.
(below). More posterior sections are toward the left and more anterior sections to the right; the left hemisphere is shown on the right for
each section. Sections have been selected to demonstrate the following key structures: (a) parietal lobes; (b) posterior temporal lobes;
(c) hippocampi; (d) anterior temporal lobes and amygdalae; (e) frontal lobes and temporal poles. The sections for B.R. show asymmetric
(predominantly left sided), selective anterior and inferior temporal lobe atrophy, typical of semantic dementia. The sections for W.W. show
generalized cerebral atrophy with disproportionate symmetrical hippocampal atrophy, typical of Alzheimer’s disease.
1202 | Brain 2010: 133; 1200–1213 R. Omar et al.semantic memory for both verbal and non-verbal material and severe
dyslexia particularly affecting irregular word reading (surface dyslexia),
with preserved general intellect, patchy impairment on executive tests,
and intact arithmetical and visuoperceptual abilities. W.W. had impair-
ments of general intellectual function, episodic memory, naming and
executive skills, with mild weakness of visuoperceptual skills and well
preserved literacy, arithmetical and visuospatial skills.
Neither patient gave a clinical history of altered hearing, however
audiometric assessment in B.R. revealed mild bilateral high frequency
hearing loss and abnormal otoacoustic emissions, probably secondary
to longstanding noise damage. W.W. had pure tone audiometry and
otoacoustic emissions within normal limits for his age.
Musical perceptual abilities were assessed in the patients and musi-
cian controls using the Montreal Battery for Evaluation of Amusia,
a widely used and normed test of music perception in musically
untrained subjects (Peretz et al., 2003), based on a two alternative
(same/different) forced choice comparison of two short unfamiliar
musical sequences. Scale (key), pitch contour (melody), pitch interval
and rhythm discrimination subtests of the Montreal Battery for
Evaluation of Amusia were administered. In addition, subjects were
administered a novel timbre discrimination test (previously described
in Garrido et al., 2009) in which the subject was presented with two
different, brief melodic excerpts each played by a single instrument;
the task was to decide whether the excerpts were played by the same
instrument or by different instruments. Excerpts were selected such
that the timbre of the instrument was strongly established whereas
recognition of the source piece was unlikely; within each pair the
two excerpts differed in pitch range, to reduce the use of non-timbral
cues. This test comprised 20 trials (10 same, 10 different pairs), includ-
ing 16 common instrument timbres (Supplementary Table S1; exam-
ples of stimuli available from the authors).
Results are summarized in Table 2. On the Montreal Battery for
Evaluation of Amusia subtests, B.R. exhibited deﬁcits of contour and
interval discrimination and W.W. exhibited a deﬁcit of interval discrim-
ination relative to healthy musicians; on the interval subtest, W.W.
(but not B.R.) had a perceptual deﬁcit (P50.05) relative to published
norms for healthy non-musician controls. On the timbre discrimination
task, B.R. exhibited a moderate deﬁcit and W.W. a mild deﬁcit relative
to healthy musicians.
Experimental assessment of music
knowledge: experimental plan and
general procedure
We designed a series of experiments to probe various aspects of
knowledge of music. Arguably the purest objects of musical knowl-
edge are the compositions (and their more basic musical constituents)
Table 1 General neuropsychological assessment of patients
Test B.R. W.W.
Score Percentile Score Percentile
General intellectual function
Ravens Advanced Matrices (/12) 11 95th 1 55th
Memory
Camden Pictorial Memory Test (/30) 30 450th 30 450th
Recognition Memory Test-words (/50) – – 28 55th
Recognition Memory Test-faces (/50) – – 33 55th
Verbal Paired Associate Learning (/16) – – 0 55th
Language
Word repetition (/30) 30 45th
a 30 45th
a
Picture naming (/20) 1 55th
a 15 55th
a
Word-picture matching (/30) 7 55th
a 29 50–75th
a
Synonyms test (concrete) (/25) 13 55th
b 22 50–75th
b
Irregular word reading (/30) 16 55th
a 30 475th
a
Executive function
Trail Making Test A 62s 55th
c 86s 55th
c
Trail Making Test B 109s 10–25th
c out of time 55th
c
Number cancellation (number in 45seconds) 21 20-40th
a 13 55th
a
Other skills
Famous faces—naming (1/2) 1 55th 0 55th
Famous faces—recognition (/12) 3
d 55th 5 55th
Digit span (forwards, backwards) – – 7,5 25–50th
c
Graded Difﬁculty Arithmetic Test: addition items (/12) 6 25–50th
e 6 25–50th
e
VOSP object decision (/20) 16 20–40th 15 10-20th
VOSP dot counting (/10) – – 10 10-50th
VOSP dot counting (mean time taken) – – 2.3s 25-50th
Percentiles calculated from standardized tests, except where marked; –=not attempted; VOSP=Visual Object and Space Perception Battery. Background information about
the tests is provided in Supplementary Table S3.
a: Calculated from previous healthy control sample (n=41–72).
b: Test administered with both visual and auditory presentation of words whereas the standardized percentiles are calculated for auditory presentation only.
c: Approximated from standardized scores.
d: Scored55th percentile on a recognition test of famous buildings, 50th percentile on Benton test of face perception.
e: Calculated from previous healthy control sample (n=100–143).
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ture (assessed in Experiment 1). Musical pieces can be considered at
different levels of analysis (general categories such as genre or era;
knowledge of particular pieces): we designed tests (Experiment 2) to
assess these different levels, and to determine whether neuropsycho-
logical constructs such as superordinate and item-speciﬁc knowledge
can be applied validly to music. Comprehension of emotion is an
essential dimension of musical understanding for most listeners and
(based on prior neuropsychological evidence) is likely to warrant
assessment in its own right (Experiment 3). Music is typically conveyed
from an external source: we aimed to assess the extent to which
knowledge of these sources (instruments) might be independent of
other aspects of music knowledge (Experiment 4). Finally, music can
be coded using a specialized notational system: tests were designed
(Experiment 5) to assess music reading in relation both to other dimen-
sions of music knowledge, and the more widespread notational system
of text.
Conventionally, knowledge of music is assessed by having the sub-
ject label the musical stimulus in some way (e.g. by naming a familiar
melody). Here, we aimed to assess associative knowledge of music
using procedures tailored to our patients’ particular cognitive and
musical abilities (e.g. B.R.’s premorbid possession of absolute pitch
and retained performance skills, W.W.’s retained verbal capacity).
Musical excerpts used are presented in Supplementary Table S1. In
selecting excerpts, we aimed to include pieces with which a person
steeped in Western classical music should be at least moderately famil-
iar after a lifetime’s listening. Examples of the stimuli are available from
the authors.
The experimental tests assessing dimensions of music knowledge
were administered to subjects over several sessions. Auditory stimuli
were presented from digital waveﬁles on a notebook computer in free
ﬁeld at a comfortable listening level in a quiet room. Visual stimuli
were presented and subject responses were collected for off-line ana-
lysis in Cogent 2000 (http://www.vislab.ucl.ac.uk/Cogent2000) run-
ning under MATLAB 7.0 (http://www.mathworks.com). Where the
test required matching between an auditory stimulus and a verbal
label, the words corresponding to the verbal choices were simulta-
neously displayed on the computer monitor and read out to the sub-
ject on each trial. Before the start of each test, several practice trials
were administered to ensure that the subject understood the task. No
feedback was given about performance during the test. No time limit
was imposed.
For each experiment, patient performance was compared to healthy
musician controls using the modiﬁed t-test procedure described by
Crawford and Howell (1998) for comparing individual test scores
against norms derived from small samples, with a statistical threshold
of P50.05. Patient and control results for the experimental battery are
summarized in Table 2.
Experiment 1
Knowledge of musical objects:
composition speciﬁc
Musical compositions can be considered as ‘musical objects’ about
which associative knowledge can be acquired. However, deﬁning
a musical object is problematic. Musical works can be altered sub-
stantially (e.g. transcribed for other instruments, transposed in
key), yet still remain readily identiﬁable. Musically untrained
listeners can recognize well-known melodies such as Happy
Birthday after only a few notes (Dalla Bella et al., 2003;
Schulkind et al., 2004). In the ﬁrst experiment, we used various
procedures to assess knowledge of particular musical objects
(compositions) by B.R. and W.W.
Patients and healthy musician controls ﬁrst performed a melody
matching task. Twenty-one famous tunes derived from the
Western classical canon, folk and pop music (Supplementary
Table S1) were recorded on a piano by one of the authors
(R.O.) using a single melody line, in the same key (G major);
19/20 melodies were in a different key to the original key of
the composition. Tunes were selected such that two readily rec-
ognizable but distinct melodic fragments could be extracted for
each tune (e.g. God Save the Queen). These fragments were
arranged in pairs such that a given pair contained fragments
from the same or different tunes: the task was to decide whether
the two fragments belonged to the same tune or to different
tunes. Melodic fragments from the ‘same’ tune could not be
matched simply by matching pitch at the end of ﬁrst clip to the
beginning of the second clip, while ‘different’ tune excerpts were
matched for musical style and tempo. This test comprised 20 trials
(10 same, 10 different pairs), presented in randomized order.
Subjects were subsequently presented with the same excerpts
and asked to name each tune.
An additional procedure was used with B.R. capitalizing on his
retained performance skills. Fifteen pieces of music in B.R.’s trum-
pet repertoire (Supplementary Table S1) were nominated by his
wife. In the ﬁrst part of the test, B.R. was presented with a musical
introduction to each piece, and in the second part of the test B.R.
was presented with the names of the same pieces: the task on
each trial was to play (or sing) the piece from memory based on
the introduction (Part 1) or the name (Part 2). B.R.’s performances
were recorded and played back to a blinded assessor (J.E.W.);
pieces that were identiﬁable to the assessor were counted as suc-
cessfully played.
An alternative additional test was administered to W.W. and the
healthy controls. In this ‘vocal–non-vocal’ test, 40 introductory
melodic excerpts of orchestral music (popular operas, oratorios,
ballets and symphonies) were presented in randomized order
(Supplementary Table S1): half the source compositions from
which the excerpts were drawn contained human voices, while
the remaining half were entirely orchestral, however no voices
were present in the excerpts presented. On hearing each excerpt,
W.W. was asked to decide whether the source composition con-
tained a voice.
Results
On the famous melody matching task, both B.R. and W.W.
showed deﬁcits relative to healthy musicians (Table 2). There
was the suggestion of dissociation between matching and
naming performance: B.R. scored 17/20 on the matching task
but was unable to name any tunes, whereas W.W. scored
14/20 on the matching task but was able to name ﬁve tunes.
B.R. was able to play only 2/15 pieces from name but played or
sang 13/15 pieces from a musical introduction (Table 2), indicat-
ing that he was able to access knowledge of particular musical
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In contrast, on the ‘vocal–non-vocal’ test W.W.’s score of 30/40
(signiﬁcantly worse than healthy musicians: Table 2) provided fur-
ther evidence for impaired item-speciﬁc knowledge of musical
compositions.
Comment
Taken together, these ﬁndings suggest that knowledge of partic-
ular musical objects (compositions) is at least partly dissociable
from the ability to label music verbally. Retained item-speciﬁc
knowledge of music can be demonstrated even in the face of
profound verbal impairment (as in B.R.), and deﬁcits of musical
item-speciﬁc knowledge can be demonstrated even where (as in
W.W.’s performance both on the within-modality melody match-
ing and vocal–non-vocal tasks) there is no requirement for
explicit verbal identiﬁcation. These ﬁndings support previous evi-
dence for a defect of familiar tune recognition in Alzheimer’s dis-
ease (Baird and Samson, 2009) and relatively preserved
knowledge of familiar tunes in semantic dementia (Hailstone
et al., 2009).
An important issue in the psychology of music concerns the role
of different memory systems (episodic, procedural and semantic).
The use of tasks based on stimuli that were altered from their
canonical form (piano versions transposed to a key different
from the original) or presented as fragments requiring familiarity
with a larger whole (the musical introductions played to B.R., the
melodic excerpts played to W.W.) is likely to have reduced depen-
dence on musical episodic memory here. While the melody match-
ing and vocal–non-vocal tasks may have involved musical imagery,
this is likely to be mediated by brain networks that are at least
partially distinct from those mediating episodic memory (Halpern
and Zatorre, 1999; Schurmann et al., 2002; Platel et al., 2003).
Intact musical procedural memory alone would not predict B.R.’s
successful performance of pieces cued from an initial fragment or
in a form other than the trumpet arrangement in which he had
learned them. In order to access the motor programme required to
execute a piece, it was ﬁrst necessary for B.R. to match the musi-
cal introduction with stored information about the composition as
a whole. We argue that this matching process accesses musical
semantic memory: stored knowledge about the musical character-
istics of the piece. We do not, however, wish to over-emphasize
this interpretation: it seems likely that any task relying on musical
performance skills must engage procedural memory to a degree;
nor can we exclude the possibility that episodic memory contrib-
utes to successful melody recognition, noting the typical promi-
nent deﬁcits of episodic memory (Table 1) and bilateral
hippocampal damage (Fig. 1) in W.W.
Experiment 2
Knowledge of musical objects
Knowledge about musical works can be acquired at different levels
of analysis. Non-musicians are able to categorize musical pieces
according to genre (jazz, folk, classical etc.) and other associative
attributes (e.g. Christmas music, nursery songs) (Halpern, 1984).
The categorizations available to trained musicians are more elab-
orate and may range from single notes or pitch intervals to generic
stylistic features linked to knowledge of composers or musical eras.
Whereas a particular composition can be assigned to a musical era
based on a number of rather broad timbral and melodic charac-
teristics, the association with a particular composer (compositional
style) is more speciﬁc, but does not rely on knowledge of the
particular composition. By analogy with other kinds of sensory
objects, these different levels of musical knowledge might
equate to superordinate knowledge about compositions versus
ﬁne-grained knowledge speciﬁc to particular compositions.
However, it has not been established whether distinctions
between levels of musical knowledge or musical categories are
reﬂected in the brain organization of knowledge about music.
Experiment 2a: categorical knowledge
of compositions
For W.W., we designed a test that required matching of a musical
excerpt to written words describing different levels of associative
knowledge about the source composition. Twenty introductory
excerpts of orchestral music (Supplementary Table S1) were
selected based on the following criteria: the source composition
was written for a prominent solo instrument, but this solo instru-
ment was not present in the excerpt presented; and each excerpt
was strongly associated melodically with the source composition.
Analogously with the vocal–non-vocal test in Experiment 1, we
reasoned that determination of an (unheard) solo instrument
would depend on speciﬁc knowledge of the source composition.
Excerpts covering Baroque, Classical, Romantic and 20th Century
eras were presented in randomized order. The task was to match
each excerpt with its era, its composer and the solo instrument for
which the source composition had been written. On each trial,
era, composer and solo instrument choices were presented
sequentially as randomized three-item written word arrays;
within the composer arrays, choices were selected such that all
derived from a single musical era; i.e. era could not be used as
a cue to composer identiﬁcation (for example, on hearing the
introduction to Grieg’s Piano Concerto, the subject was presented
with the arrays: ‘Baroque–Romantic–20th Century’; followed by:
‘Bruch–Grieg–Schumann’; followed by: ‘piano–cello–viola’; further
examples are summarized in Supplementary Table S2).
As an extension to this ‘solo test’, we also administered to
W.W. a test to probe for the existence of knowledge category
effects in music. If musical knowledge is organized into neuropsy-
chological semantic categories, one might expect more frequent
misidentiﬁcations of musical items within a category than for items
in different categories. The semantic category probed here was
‘composer’. On being presented with an orchestral musical excerpt
(Tables S1 and S2), the subject was asked to make a
four-alternative forced-choice decision regarding the name of
the piece. Twenty-eight excerpts were presented in randomized
order; piece names were presented as four-item written arrays.
The test was presented in two separate condition blocks, accord-
ing to the semantic relatedness of the name arrays: in the ﬁrst,
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were names of pieces composed by the same composer; in the
second, between-category (less closely semantically related) con-
dition, foils were pieces composed by different composers from
the same era.
Results
On the solo test, W.W. performed best for recognition of era,
followed by composer, followed by solo instrument (Table 2).
W.W.’s ability to recognize musical era was comparable to healthy
musicians; in contrast, he performed signiﬁcantly worse than con-
trols on other components of this test. In the semantic relatedness
test, W.W. scored 14/28 when target piece names were presented
with foils by the same composer. His performance improved to
21/28 when the foils were titles of pieces by different composers.
W.W.’s performance on this test was above chance but inferior to
healthy musicians.
Comment
The pattern of W.W.’s results on the solo test suggests that super-
ordinate knowledge (musical era) is more robust to the effects of
brain damage than item-speciﬁc knowledge about particular com-
positions. In addition, W.W. was more likely to confuse composi-
tions by the same composer with each other than with pieces by
other composers with similar style. Together these ﬁndings support
the existence of categories of musical object knowledge: we
suggest that ‘composer’ (compositional style) is one category
for organizing knowledge about musical objects (musical
compositions).
Experiment 2b: Absolute pitch
This test administered to B.R. capitalized on his reported status as
an absolute pitch possessor. Absolute pitch is the capacity, rare
amongst musicians, to identify or reproduce musical pitch values
without an external reference; it can be considered associative
music knowledge at the level of individual notes or pitch values
(typically, association of pitch values with verbal labels) (Levitin
and Rogers, 2005). While absolute pitch is a highly specialized
skill, it indexes a fundamental aspect of musical object knowledge,
since individual notes are the ultimate building blocks of music: in
non-possessors (the majority of listeners), knowledge of pitch
values resides in the relations between pitches (i.e. pitch intervals)
rather than individual notes themselves. The experimental task
here required identiﬁcation of 20 musical pitches presented in iso-
lation. Pitches were presented at random drawn from a two
octave range A3 to G4 (220–392Hz) using an electronic piano
timbre (synthesized in Sibelius v4, 2005; http://sibelius.com).
Results
B.R. identiﬁed 55% of pitches correctly (Table 2). Absolute pitch
possessors typically score 50-100% on such tests (Levitin and
Rogers, 2005); moreover, possessors are often correct within
one semitone of the target pitch, and B.R. identiﬁed 85% of
pitches correct within one semitone. His performance was clearly
superior to healthy musician non-possessors (mean pitch naming
score 1.5/20, 12.5% within one semitone of target).
Comment
These results indicate that B.R. retained absolute pitch ability.
There is a spectrum of abilities amongst possessors and it is of
course possible that B.R.’s absolute pitch ability had declined
from premorbid level. However, the ﬁndings support previous evi-
dence that absolute pitch may be preserved after extensive left
anterior temporal lobe damage (Zatorre, 1989), and suggest that
musical pitch may constitute a privileged route to naming in
semantic dementia. These results contrast with B.R.’s performance
on the famous melody matching test of composition-level knowl-
edge (Experiment 1), in which his ability to identify particular com-
positions (though superior to his ability to name them) was inferior
to healthy musicians.
Interpreted together, these ﬁndings in W.W. and B.R. suggest
that superordinate knowledge about musical objects (composi-
tions) is dissociable from speciﬁc knowledge of those objects.
Superordinate generic knowledge about musical style (era and
composer) and knowledge about the building blocks of musical
objects (individual notes) may be more robust than musical
object (composition)-speciﬁc knowledge.
Experiment 3
Knowledge of musical emotions
The relations between emotion recognition in music and other
aspects of music cognition have not been fully deﬁned.
Dissociations between emotion processing and other musical per-
ceptual and associative functions are well-documented (Peretz
et al., 1998; Grifﬁths et al., 2004; Peretz and Zatorre, 2005).
Furthermore, music emotion judgements have been found to be
relatively resistant to brain damage (Peretz et al., 1998).
Recognition of emotion in music is likely to be inﬂuenced by the
internalization of ‘rules’ or conventions for conveying particular
emotions in the listener’s particular musical culture (Juslin and
Vastfjall, 2008) as well as by transcultural factors (Fritz et al.,
2009).
Here we designed a novel battery to assess recognition of four
canonical emotions (happiness, sadness, anger, fear) (Ekman and
Friesen, 1976) as represented in music. Stimuli were excerpts
drawn from the Western classical canon and ﬁlm scores
(Supplementary Table S1). Forty trials were presented, comprising
10 musical excerpts representing each of the four target emotions
in randomized order. On each trial, the subject was asked to
choose which one of the four target emotions was best repre-
sented by the stimulus. In order to rule out any confound from
the use of verbal labels in this test, B.R.’s ability to identify emo-
tions from facial expressions was also assessed using an identical
procedure with corresponding stimuli (Ekman and Friesen, 1976).
Results
Recognition of musical emotions by W.W. was comparable to
healthy musicians (score 34/40; control mean 33.3: Table 2).
B.R.’s recognition of musical emotions was very impaired (score
17/40): this was not attributable to the verbal response procedure,
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ter [score 30/40; 
2(1) 7.42, P50.01]. B.R. had relatively greater
difﬁculty recognising negative than positive musical emotions
(individual scores: anger, 1/10; fear 4/10; happiness, 7/10;
sadness, 5/10). W.W.’s scores on the same stimuli (anger 9/10;
fear 8/10; happiness, 8/10; sadness, 9/10) indicate that B.R.’s
performance proﬁle was not attributable simply to stimulus
factors.
Comment
Together with the results of Experiments 1 and 2, these ﬁndings
indicate a partial dissociation of emotion recognition from other
aspects of musical object knowledge, consistent with ﬁndings in
previous case studies of patients with focal brain damage (Peretz
et al., 1998; Grifﬁths et al., 2004; Peretz and Zatorre, 2005). The
present ﬁndings suggest that focal degenerative pathologies (like
semantic dementia) may degrade emotion recognition in music.
This corroborates previous evidence for multimodal emotion rec-
ognition deﬁcits in semantic dementia (Rosen et al., 2002; Werner
et al., 2007). B.R. exhibited a more severe deﬁcit for recognition
of negative compared with positive musical emotions: this would
also be consistent with previous data in other affective modalities,
but requires care in interpretation since ‘happiness’ in music (like
other modalities) requires less ﬁne-grained differentiation than do
individual negative emotions.
Experiment 4
Knowledge of musical sources:
instruments
If musical compositions are the objects around which knowledge
of music is built, to convey music in general requires an acoustic
source. These sources, musical instruments, constitute a specialized
category of semantic knowledge (Dixon et al., 2000; Mahon and
Caramazza, 2009). The distinction we draw here between musical
compositions as ‘objects’ and instruments as ‘sources’ is largely
pragmatic, since instrument timbres are ‘auditory objects’ in a
broader sense (Grifﬁths and Warren, 2004). However, much pre-
vious work has addressed the recognition of musical instruments
from their pictures (i.e. instruments as visual artefacts) whereas it
could be argued that the essential character of a musical instru-
ment is auditory. In this experiment we assessed identiﬁcation,
naming and cross-modal matching of musical instruments in the
auditory and visual modalities. Audio waveﬁles of 20 musical
instruments (Supplementary Table S1) were presented sequentially
in randomized order and pictures of the same instruments were
presented in an alternative randomized order. Subjects were asked
to name or otherwise identify the instrument. Apart from naming,
instrument recognition could be demonstrated by providing a
piece of information about the instrument (e.g. ‘not a clarinet, it
begins with ‘‘s’’’ to indicate recognition of a saxophone) or by
miming how the instrument would be played; as it is difﬁcult
to indicate speciﬁc identiﬁcation of some instruments without
naming, recognition was also credited if the instrument family
(e.g. percussion, woodwind) was identiﬁed correctly. A recognition
deﬁcit in either modality was further probed using a cross-modal
procedure in which the same set of instrument sounds was pre-
sented in randomized order together with arrays of four written
instrument names and pictures, and the task was to match each
instrument sound with the correct name-picture combination.
Results
B.R. was able to name only 2/20 instruments from sound and
4/20 instruments from pictures (Table 2); he was able to provide
identifying information for only 8/20 instruments from sound but
19/20 instruments from pictures. On the cross-modal instrument
sound to picture four-alternative-forced-choice matching task, his
score improved to 18/20, which was still inferior to the ﬂawless
performance of healthy musicians on this task. W.W. made errors
on naming instruments both from sounds and pictures; however
his ability to identify instruments in each modality did not differ
signiﬁcantly from healthy musicians (Table 2).
Comment
Together with the results of Experiments 1 and 2, these ﬁndings
support a double dissociation between knowledge of musical
objects (compositions) and knowledge of musical sources (instru-
ments): W.W. demonstrated normal auditory instrument recogni-
tion but impaired composition-speciﬁc knowledge, while B.R.
showed very impaired auditory instrument recognition despite rel-
atively preserved composition-speciﬁc knowledge. Furthermore,
within the category of musical instruments, B.R.’s markedly
impaired identiﬁcation of instruments from sound contrasted
with his largely intact ability to recognize instruments visually.
His auditory identiﬁcation performance improved (though not to
normal level) if cross-modal visual information was available. B.R.’s
performance contrasted with that of W.W. who (despite impaired
naming ability) was able to identify instruments normally in both
the auditory and visual modalities. While it is tempting to ascribe
the pattern of deﬁcits exhibited by B.R. to an auditory associative
agnosia affecting instruments, the ﬁndings on the musical percep-
tual tasks (Experiment 1, Table 2) suggest a need for some cau-
tion. B.R. did have evidence of a perceptual deﬁcit affecting, in
particular, timbre discrimination; it is therefore possible that
the effects of degraded timbral representations interacted
with auditory-based recognition of particular instruments.
This interpretation would be consistent with previous neuropsy-
chological evidence implicating ‘basic object level’ processing in
the recognition of musical instruments (Palmer et al., 1989;
Kohlmetz et al., 2003). On the other hand, a purely perceptual
deﬁcit would not easily account for B.R.’s improved performance
on the auditory-visual matching task. We propose that B.R.
retained sufﬁcient general categorical information about instru-
ment sounds to enable identiﬁcation to be achieved once more
speciﬁc visual information was available (Palmer et al., 1989).
1208 | Brain 2010: 133; 1200–1213 R. Omar et al.Experiment 5
Knowledge of musical symbols
Like many languages, music has a complex system of symbolic
written notation with agreed ‘rules’ for how these symbols
should be understood and translated into musical output. Here
we were interested to probe different levels of musical symbol
comprehension.
In the ﬁrst part of the experiment, 10 common musical symbols
were presented sequentially and the task was to identify each
symbol. If the subject was unable to name but was able to indi-
cate unambiguously that they recognized the symbol (e.g. describ-
ing a crotchet as ‘like a minim but just one not two’), this was
recorded. A supplementary test probing knowledge of key signa-
tures and the notation of the clef was administered to W.W. and
healthy musicians. On 18 sequential trials, minim notes were pre-
sented on a stave with a key signature; a range of keys (half
major, half minor) and accidentals either in the treble or the
bass clef. On the initial eight trials, the task was to identify the
key signature. On the following 10 trials the task was to identify
the pitch of the note; in order to identify the pitch correctly, it was
necessary both to interpret the key signature and to understand
the notation of the clef.
The second part of the experiment was designed as a musical
analogue of the ‘Synonyms Test’ on word pairs, which has been
widely used to assess single word comprehension (Warrington
et al., 1998). While there is no precise equivalent to a ‘synonym’
in musical notation, there are often alternative ways of writing the
same musical instruction which differ substantially in surface struc-
ture: in order to determine whether two musical notations are
equivalent, understanding of the musical meaning of each instruc-
tion is required. Twenty pairs of musical notes or rests were pre-
sented sequentially in randomized order. The two items in each
pair were always notated differently, however 10 pairs repre-
sented the same note (or rest duration) if played (‘musical syn-
onyms’), while the remaining 10 pairs represented notes with
different pitch or duration (or rests of different duration) if
played (examples shown in Fig. 2). On each trial the subject
was asked to determine whether the two notes or rests were
equivalent.
Results
B.R. and W.W. showed diverging patterns of performance on
these tests (Table 2). Whereas naming of musical notes was
impaired in both patients (both scored 6/10), B.R. performed ﬂaw-
lessly on tests of symbol comprehension, similar to healthy musi-
cians (Table 1), while W.W. made errors even on the easier
musical symbol identiﬁcation task (score 8/10). W.W.’s compre-
hension of musical symbols beneﬁted from the availability of a
musical context (key identiﬁcation 6/8, note identiﬁcation, 9/10,
total score 15/18; not signiﬁcantly different from healthy con-
trols), but deteriorated on the ‘Musical Synonyms’ task requiring
assessment of symbol equivalence (score 15/20).
Comment
The pattern of performance of B.R. and W.W. on the musical
symbol comprehension tasks suggests a partial dissociation from
other dimensions of music knowledge. B.R. exhibited a retained
comprehension of musical symbols despite impaired knowledge of
musical sources and emotions, while W.W. showed a deﬁcit of
musical symbol comprehension despite intact knowledge of musi-
cal sources and emotions. There are several potential caveats on
the interpretation of W.W.’s poor performance in this experiment.
Musical notation is visuospatially complex; however, W.W. did not
show frank visuospatial or visuoperceptual deﬁcits on general neu-
ropsychological assessment (Table 1). Particularly in the Musical
Synonyms test, there was a demand for executive processing in
switching between stimuli in a given pair and between different
symbol transcoding ‘rules’ on sequential trials. However, B.R., who
also had evidence of executive dysfunction, performed at ceiling
on this task. We therefore propose that W.W. has a speciﬁc dis-
order of music symbol comprehension.
Discussion
Here we have presented neuropsychological proﬁles that together
suggest a cognitive organization for music knowledge. The ﬁnd-
ings suggest that associative knowledge of music is at least partly
dissociable from other neuropsychological functions and from
musical perceptual ability. Within the domain of music knowledge,
the ﬁndings support a modular organization with dissociations
(summarized in Table 3) between knowledge of musical objects
(compositions) and symbols (notation) versus knowledge of musi-
cal sources (instruments) and emotions. With respect to
Figure 2 Examples of trials from the ‘Musical Synonyms’ test.
In each trial the two items in each pair were notated differently
and the task was to determine whether the two notes repre-
sented were equivalent (i.e. the same if played): in the examples
shown, the notations above signify the ‘same’ note (D-ﬂat –
C-sharp) when played (i.e. this pair are ‘musical synonyms’); the
notations below signify ‘different’ notes (B-ﬂat and B-sharp)
when played.
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musical style (eras, composers) and note values (absolute pitch)
is less vulnerable than ﬁne-grained, object-speciﬁc knowledge
about particular compositions. The demonstration of semantic
relatedness effects further suggests that musical categories such
as composer have neuropsychological validity. Based on these
ﬁndings, we propose that music constitutes a distinct but fractio-
nated domain of non-verbal associative knowledge. We interpret
the present ﬁndings as evidence of a relatively independent asso-
ciative knowledge system for music that may be neuropsycholo-
gically equivalent to semantic memory systems in other cognitive
domains and share at least some cognitive features with other
domains of knowledge (Murre et al., 2001).
The selectivity of brain damage even in a ‘focal’ dementia such
as semantic dementia is relative rather than absolute, and anatom-
ical correlation is necessarily limited. Nevertheless, the pattern of
ﬁndings here would be consistent with neuroanatomical substrates
for musical semantic memory that are partly separable from other
domains of semantic memory, and consistent with our prior
hypotheses concerning semantic dementia and Alzheimer’s dis-
ease. Knowledge of musical instruments and emotions may
depend on inferior frontal and anterior temporal areas previously
implicated in processing analogous kinds of information in voices
and other domains (Grifﬁths et al., 2004; Khalfa et al., 2005;
Gosselin et al., 2006; Schirmer and Kotz, 2006; Be ´lizaire et al.,
2007; Eldar et al., 2007; Gosselin et al., 2007); following this
interpretation, the striking involvement of anterior temporal lobe
cortex and amygdala in B.R. (Fig. 1) would provide a neural cor-
relate for impaired processing of both musical sources (instru-
ments) and emotions in semantic dementia. In contrast,
knowledge of musical objects (compositions) and symbols may
have a substrate distinct both from non-musical knowledge
domains and from knowledge of musical sources and emotions.
The relatively selective sparing of knowledge of musical composi-
tions shown by B.R. is consistent with previous evidence in seman-
tic dementia (Hailstone et al., 2009). Anatomically, this could
reﬂect a relatively greater dependence of musical object and
symbol knowledge on brain areas beyond the anterior temporal
lobe, as suggested by previous functional imaging (Platel et al.,
2003; Satoh et al., 2006) and focal lesion (Stewart et al., 2006)
studies implicating a distributed network of perisylvian areas in
processes such as familiar melody recognition. This anatomical
interpretation would be consistent with the more generalized
involvement of perisylvian cortices in W.W. with Alzheimer’s dis-
ease (Fig.1).
In addition to any separation of anatomical substrates, might
distinct cognitive operations dissociate musical object and symbol
knowledge from other dimensions of musical and extra-musical
associative knowledge? There are two important caveats to this
interpretation. First, due to the particular proﬁles of general cog-
nitive competence retained by our patients, it was necessary to
use tasks to exploit these competencies, rather than a uniform
musical battery: the tasks used to assess a particular musical func-
tion in each patient were not equivalent in their processing
demands (for example, the performance task used in Experiment
1 with B.R. required intact praxic skills and procedural memory,
while the tasks used with W.W. did not). Second, the demands for
associative processing are not a priori equivalent between the var-
ious dimensions of music knowledge: knowledge of musical com-
positions is likely to depend on semantic and autobiographical
factors, and knowledge of music notation is a specialized skill,
whereas knowledge of musical instruments or emotions is likely
to be less dependent on past experience, but on the other hand
might be more susceptible to cross-modal and other inﬂuences.
Nevertheless, the ﬁnding of doubly dissociated performance pro-
ﬁles between B.R. and W.W. here (Table 3) suggests that relations
between the dimensions of musical knowledge are modular, rather
than (strictly) hierarchical, in keeping with current theoretical and
empirical formulations (Peretz and Coltheart, 2003; Peretz and
Zatorre, 2005). Musical instrument sounds and musical emotions
are closely associated with physical objects and affective states,
respectively, in the extra-musical world: musical instruments exist
as artefacts, and musical instrument timbres share many features
with animate voices (Be ´lizaire et al., 2007), while musical emotions
align with similar emotions expressed by voices and faces (Eldar
et al., 2007). It is therefore plausible that the processing of these
aspects of musical knowledge should have neuropsychological
similarities with the processing of other kinds of sensory object
knowledge, and perhaps also with language, which derives mean-
ing exclusively from its external referents. Musical emotion has a
further dimension of subjective arousal that was not indexed here,
but which may interact with cognitive mechanisms for emotion
analysis and musical meaning more generally (Koelsch et al.,
2008). From the clinical standpoint, it may also be relevant
that understanding of musical emotion (unlike other dimensions
of music knowledge) does not necessarily depend on specialized
training: this suggests a possible therapeutic opportunity
(Sarkamo et al., 2008; Koeslch, 2009). These are important
issues for future work. In contrast to instruments and emotions,
musical compositions and symbols may constitute a relatively
self-contained knowledge system that is more dependent
on abstract characteristics that are intrinsic to the musical stimu-
lus and less grounded in the non-musical world (Huron, 2006;
Steinbeis and Koeslch, 2008a). Though any parallel must be cau-
tious, we speculate that knowledge of abstract musical
entities (such as compositions) may align with knowledge of
another abstract non-verbal system, mathematics, some aspects
of which may also be relatively spared in semantic dementia
(Crutch and Warrington, 2002; Jefferies et al., 2005; Zamarian
et al., 2006).
Our ﬁndings speak to the longstanding debate concerning the
neurobiological status of music (Peretz and Zatorre, 2005;
Table 3 Neuropsychological dissociations within the
domain of music knowledge
Musical domain B.R.
(semantic dementia)
W.W.
(Alzheimer’s disease)
Musical objects ## #
Musical emotions ## N
Musical sources ## N
Musical symbols N ##
N=normal performance; #=impaired performance relative to controls;
##=impaired performance relative to both controls and other case.
1210 | Brain 2010: 133; 1200–1213 R. Omar et al.Fitch, 2006; Patel, 2008; Steinbeis and Koeslch, 2008a, b). Direct
comparisons between musical and verbal functioning are problem-
atic, for the very reason that music and language have unique
processing demands. It is generally not possible to equate these
demands between modalities: a music reading test, for example,
taps knowledge of a relatively small set of symbols compared with
the vast corpus of words, and whereas word familiarity (fre-
quency) can be quantiﬁed reliably for native speakers of the
language, musical familiarity is heavily dependent on autobio-
graphical experience. On the other hand, while language skills
are universal, musical skills are acquired by only a small minority
of the population. Taking these caveats into account, the present
ﬁndings suggest that sophisticated musical understanding can sur-
vive even grave impairment of verbal capacity (as in B.R.); on the
other hand, aspects of musical understanding may be eroded even
where verbal knowledge is more or less unscathed (as in W.W.).
We propose that the abstract nature of certain key objects of
music knowledge (such as melodies) may make such objects less
reliant on knowledge about things in the world at large. We argue
that studies of this kind further the case for music as a phenom-
enon of fundamental neurobiological relevance in human evolu-
tion (Fitch, 2006): only music can encode certain kinds of
non-verbal symbolic information, and further, that information
(whatever its original nature) was of sufﬁcient evolutionary value
to acquire a dedicated neural substrate.
The pattern of deﬁcits observed here on tasks assessing com-
prehension of musical notation corroborates previous observations
in the context of focal brain damage (Judd et al., 1983; Basso
and Capitani, 1985; Cappelletti et al., 2000; McDonald, 2006).
Like verbal symbols, musical symbols can be transcoded into
sound-based representations or motor representations, or pro-
cessed directly for meaning. However, the information coded by
musical notation is essentially spatial (pitch values on a stave) and
temporal (note and rest duration values, rhythm, metre), and the
motor outputs based on this information (as when playing
an instrument) involve precise spatio-temporal transformations
(Hebert and Cuddy, 2006; Brodsky et al., 2008; Wong and
Gauthier, 2009). It is therefore possible that the meaning of musi-
cal symbols arises from the interaction of semantic with sensori-
motor processes. In anatomical terms, music reading is vulnerable
to focal lesions involving the parieto-temporal junction (Hebert
and Cuddy, 2006; McDonald, 2006). This is supported by the
evidence presented by the neurodegenerative pathologies here
(Fig. 1): loss of music reading skills accompanied a disease
(Alzheimer’s disease) involving the parietal lobes, whereas music
reading was preserved in a disease (semantic dementia) that selec-
tively damages the anterior temporal lobes.
Studies of this kind capitalize on the interaction of strategic
forms of brain damage with premorbid specialized knowledge
(McNeil and Warrington, 1993; Crutch and Warrington, 2002,
2003; Jefferies et al., 2005); indeed, the unique skills possessed
by expert musicians here were an essential prerequisite in order to
undertake a detailed analysis of multiple dimensions of music
knowledge. The ability to generalize conclusions that are based
on the study of individuals with specialist skills is typically limited.
However, music offers certain advantages over other domains of
specialist knowledge in that musical expertise is not rare in the
wider population and there is a widely accepted ‘canon’ of musical
skills and compositions, enabling the uniform assessment of music
knowledge in a population of healthy individuals with similar musi-
cal backgrounds. Furthermore, the experience of music is univer-
sal, and musical knowledge in some form is possessed by all
normal listeners. Taking these considerations into account, the
present ﬁndings suggest a rationale for a more detailed clinical
analysis of the value of music-based therapies tailored to particular
dementia diseases. Furthermore, the ﬁndings raise fundamental
issues concerning the brain organization of non-verbal knowledge
systems and the nature of musical knowledge. On the one hand,
the existence of distinctive brain knowledge systems for music
suggests that music may have played a speciﬁc biological role in
human evolution. On the other hand, evidence for a multidimen-
sional neuropsychological organization of music knowledge sug-
gests parallels with other cognitive domains and argues for
important similarities in the cognitive architecture of different
brain knowledge systems.
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